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The OPEC World Oil Outlook (WOO) provides projections for the medium-term (to 
2018) and long-term (to 2035) on an annual basis for oil demand and supply. It 
demonstrates that oil will continue to play a major part in satisfying the world’s 
growing energy needs, with amply sufficient oil resources and a diversity of sup-
ply sources contributing to world prosperity and to poverty alleviation. The WOO 
also clearly illustrates the uncertainties that surround the medium- to long-term 
energy future, stemming from many drivers, such as the world economy, policies, 
technology and consumer choices. It also confirms again the growing importance 
of developing countries in terms of energy demand, as well as the emergence of 
a diversity of energy supply sources worldwide, resulting in a sizable change of 
energy flows.
Oil prices assumed to remain stable in the long-run
The rising cost of supplying the marginal barrel has been, and remains, one of the 
major factors in making assumptions for oil prices over the medium- and long-term. 
Upstream capital costs more than doubled over the 2004–2008 period. Downward 
cost pressures stemming from the global recession were only temporary and since 
the beginning of 2010 upstream capital costs have been rising again, albeit at a 
slow pace. The oil price assumption of the WOO 2013 Reference Case reflects these 
cost developments and is similar to the previous year’s assumption. The nominal 
OPEC Reference Basket (ORB) price remains at an average of $110/b over the pe-
riod to 2020 and then rises, reaching a nominal value of $160/b by 2035. In real 
terms, the ORB is $100/b by that year. This represents a slight upward revision from 
the WOO 2012. 
A regulatory framework of financial market reform is emerging
Recognition of the adverse impacts of speculation on oil price volatility has resulted 
in continued efforts to address regulatory deficiencies in ‘paper’ commodity markets 
and the broader financial markets. This marks a shift from the deregulatory ap-
proach that has dominated markets for almost three decades. Better data on futures 
trading activity has provided a better understanding of how financial investment 
flows impact price developments and price volatility. An international framework of 
regulatory standards and cooperation is emerging. This includes actions such as the 
implementation of principles for oil Price Reporting Agencies (PRAs) in the com-
modity markets. Regulators – and policymakers, more generally – are nevertheless 
aware of the need to move forward with caution to avoid taking actions that could 
impede market functioning.
Medium-term economic growth sees delayed full recovery from recession
The assumption for medium-term economic growth to 2018 is that the global re-
covery from the recession will be more delayed than previously thought.* Over the 
period 2014–2018, global growth averages 3.8% per annum (p.a.). The medium-
term gross domestic product (GDP) expansion for OECD America is stronger than in 
the WOO 2012. This is largely a reflection of improving domestic demand in the US 
supported by the recovery of the housing sector, healthy capital markets, continued 
*  In line with the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook of October 2013.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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low interest rates, and also the fact that companies are highly liquid post-recession 
and are expected to increase investments into the economy in the coming years. 
The Euro-zone economic crisis, on the other hand, continues to cast a shadow over 
the magnitude and speed of recovery in OECD Europe. Growth in Latin America 
and the Middle East & Africa has been revised upwards for the medium-term, re-
flecting higher oil revenues, low labour costs and rising foreign direct investments 
(FDI), particularly from China. In India, economic growth rates have been revised 
upwards for the medium-term, particularly for 2017 and 2018, following a drop in 
the short-term. Nevertheless, there remain some uncertainties over India’s ability 
to take advantage of its growth potential in the coming years. Economic growth in 
China remains high, albeit slowing, in the Reference Case. 
Demographic developments are a key driver of long-term economic growth
Looking to long-term economic growth assumptions, population developments (in 
terms of both volume and age structure) affect the potential for economic growth. 
UN estimates see the global population rising from 7 billion in 2012 to 8.6 billion 
in 2035 under its median scenario. The rise occurs mainly in developing countries. 
By 2021, India will have a larger population than China for the first time, becom-
ing the world’s most 
populated country. In 
addition, age struc-
ture – which impacts 
the labour force and 
the rate of change of 
those in the popula-
tion that are of driv-
ing licence age – sees 
important changes: 
China’s working age 
population, for ex-
ample, is expected 
to peak within three 
years and then start 
declining. Another 
important demographic trend is the expected rapid rise of urbanization. By 2035, 
63% of the global population is expected to be in urban areas. All regions should 
experience this trend, with the dominant growth expected in developing countries 
where the urban population is anticipated to increase by more than 1.6 billion, 
close to 90% of the urban expansion over the period. This will have very important 
implications in terms of energy use, since vehicle ownership patterns and vehicle 
miles travelled are closely linked to urbanization trends. 
Average global economic growth assumptions raised to 3.5% p.a. for 
2013–2035
Long-term economic growth rates average 3.5% p.a. over the period 2013–2035, 
up from the 3.4% in the WOO 2012. Growth rates in all regions are slower for the 
period 2021–2035 compared to 2013–2020, reflecting downward demographic 
and productivity trends. By 2035, the Chinese economy will be much larger than 
Changes to urban and rural population size by region, 2012–2035 Real GDP by region in 2012 and 2035
Increase in number of passenger cars, 2010–2035
Change in non-OPEC supply, 2012–2018
Tight oil supply in OECD America to 2035
OPEC crude oil supply in the economic growth scenarios
Assumption for tight oil supply in North America
in the upside supply scenario
–300
–200
–100
0
100
200
300
400
500
OECD
America
OECD
Europe
OECD
Asia
Oceania
Latin
America
Middle
East &
Africa
India China Other
Asia
OPEC Russia Other
Eurasia
millions
Urban change
Rural change
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
$(2005) trillion
2035
2012
Other Eurasia
Russia
Middle East & Africa
OPEC
India
Latin America
Other Asia
OECD Asia Oceania
China
OECD Europe
OECD America
–1.0 –0.5 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Other liquids
Biofuels
Other Eurasia
Russia
China
Asia
Middle East & Africa
Latin America
OECD Asia Oceania
OECD Europe
Mexico
US & Canada
mb/d
Crude and NGLs
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
China India Other
Asia
OPEC OECD
America
Latin
America
Middle
East &
Africa
Other OECD
Europe
Russia OECD
Asia
Oceania
millions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
mb/d
OECD America
US
Canada
Reference Case
Higher economic growth (HEG)
Lower economic growth (LEG)
20
25
30
35
40
45
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
mb/d
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
mb/d
Upside supply scenario (UPS)
Reference CaseEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ES
7
World Oil Outlook 2013 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD America and double that of OECD Europe. India’s growth, which will average 
6.3% p.a. to 2035, means that its share in global GDP doubles from 5.4% in 2010 
to 10.6% by 2035. (It is worth noting that while the Indian economy was just 25% 
of the size of OECD Europe in 2010, it will be almost 80% of the size by 2035, 
suggesting that by 2040 it is likely that the Indian economy will be as large as 
OECD Europe.) The share of developing Asian countries in the global economic ac-
tivity rises in the Ref-
erence Case from 
26% in 2010 to 
44% by 2035. De-
spite these realign-
ments in terms of 
GDP size, OECD re-
gions will still have 
higher levels of GDP 
per capita by 2035. 
In real terms, OECD 
America will reach 
$52,000 per head. 
China’s expansion to 
become the world’s 
largest economy 
brings with it strong 
development in per capita income: by 2035, its GDP per head of $30,000 will 
reach a level higher than the 2012 GDP per capita of either OECD Europe or OECD 
Asia Oceania. However, India still averages just $10,500 per head by 2035, less 
than $30 per day. Average OPEC GDP per capita is only slightly higher. Other Asia 
remains at even lower levels, while Middle East & Africa (84% of the population of 
this grouping is in Africa) remains the poorest region, at $3,600 per head. 
Energy policies also shape the Reference Case
The Reference Case takes into account energy policies that are already in place. 
However, each successive year’s WOO entails monitoring new policies that have 
been enacted that year, as well as reassessing the impact of policies that were 
implemented in the past. The Reference Case does not consider policies that 
have not yet been enacted even if they are currently being debated and pro-
posed. A significant regulation that entered into force at the beginning of 2013 
was related to energy efficiency levels for international shipping, which were 
mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in July 2011. These 
measures are an Energy Efficiency Design Index for new ships and a Ship Energy 
Efficiency Management Plan for all ships, with the former having long-term (and 
probably bigger) impacts and the latter having greater relevance for the medium-
term. From the supply side, the viability of the EU’s 10% biofuels target in road 
transportation by 2020 is increasingly being questioned in light of on-going dis-
cussions about the sustainability of crop-based biofuels, as well as the recent 
decision of the European Parliament that such biofuels should not exceed 6% 
of fuel used in the transport sector by 2020. This policy shift is reflected in the 
Reference Case.
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Biomass supply now includes non-commercial use
In this year’s Outlook, for the first time all biomass use is included in the portrayal 
of the energy supply mix. In the past, the figures provided were for commercial en-
ergy use only, which meant excluding the non-commercial use of biofuels. This was 
done primarily because of the unreliability of data for this source of energy supply. 
However, the quality of the data has gradually improved and has opened up the op-
portunity to include all forms of biofuel use. 
Energy demand increases by 52% by 2035 and fossil fuels remain above 
80% of supply
Over the projection period 2010–2035, energy demand in the Reference Case in-
creases by 52%. This is slightly lower growth compared to the WOO 2012, in part 
because of the change to using all forms of biomass supply. Developing countries 
continue to switch from non-commercial to commercial energy use over the projec-
tion period. This is a zero-sum switch with the inclusion of all biomass, but registers 
as a demand increase in the previous mode. This lower growth also reflects the fact 
that commercial energy use is more efficient than non-commercial consumption. 
Fossil fuels accounted for 82% of energy supply in 2010 and constitute 80% of the 
global total by 2035. Throughout most of the projection period, oil will retain the 
largest share. However, in the Reference Case, each of the fossil fuel types converge 
towards similar shares of around 26–27% each by 2035. In volume terms, natural 
gas use rises faster than any other form of energy supply. In percentage terms, gas 
rises faster than any fuel except non-hydro renewables. 
World supply of primary energy in the Reference Case
Levels
mboe/d
Growth
% p.a.
Fuel shares
%
2010 2020 2035 2010–35 2010 2020 2035
Oil 81.2 89.7 100.2 0.8 32.2 30.0 26.3
Coal 69.8 84.9 104.0 1.6 27.7 28.4 27.2
Gas 54.8 69.0 99.8 2.4 21.7 23.1 26.0
Nuclear 14.3 16.0 21.6 1.7 5.7 5.4 5.7
Hydro 5.8 7.4 10.1 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6
Biomass 24.4 28.0 35.2 1.5 9.7 9.4 9.2
Other renewables 1.8 3.6 10.7 7.5 0.7 1.2 2.8
Total 251.9 298.6 381.7 1.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
Shale gas an increasingly important source of energy
The increased attention paid to natural gas worldwide is closely linked to the emer-
gence of shale gas as a growing source of supply in the US and Canada. The fact 
that gas prices are relatively low means that gas is increasingly being used in the 
US for power generation. Attention is also increasingly turning to the use of gas 
in the transport sector. Despite the rapid rise of supply from shale gas and its EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ES
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evidently large resource base, there are many potential barriers to the continued 
rise in supply, in both the medium- and long-term. These include concerns about 
potential adverse environmental impacts, the disposal of waste water and exces-
sive water use. However, these concerns seem to be receding. Another question 
relates to the behaviour of gas prices in the future. Prices in the US are well below 
those in Europe and Asia, and it is possible that increased inter-regional gas flows 
(particularly if expected US LNG exports materialize) will establish more linkages 
among these markets. However, this does not necessarily mean uniformity in pricing 
mechanisms nor a sharp convergence in prices, given the varied market structures, 
high LNG transport costs and steps to mitigate risks (particularly demand risks) that 
are needed to be able to develop an upfront capital-intensive gas liquefaction in-
frastructure. Another significant uncertainty revolves around how fast infrastructure 
development and the refitting of commercial trucks, requirements to make natural 
gas an important fuel in the transportation sector, can be undertaken. 
Coal use moving from US to Europe, though most future growth will be in 
developing countries
Coal resources are abundant. At current rates of production, the ratio of reserves to 
production is more than double that for oil or gas. The highest level of reserves is in 
the US with 28% of the world’s total. Recently, coal has been displaced by natural 
gas in the US power generation sector as shale gas supplies rise. As a result, cheap 
US coal imports to Europe have displaced natural gas in the generation of electric-
ity, helped by a very low carbon Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) price, and despite 
the high efficiency of natural gas-based power plants and their relatively lower emis-
sions. Meanwhile, coal use in Japan continues to rise due to the closure of nuclear 
power plants following the Fukushima disaster. The main growth in coal use in the 
Reference Case is in non-OECD countries where the main driving force will be India. 
Recent coal shortages there, however, have increased imports and may constitute a 
constraint to the expansion of coal use. 
Medium-term oil demand set to rise by 0.9 mb/d annually in the Reference 
Case
Turning to oil demand, the Reference Case demand for the medium-term period 
2012–2018 increases by an average of 0.9 mb/d annually, reaching 94.4 mb/d by 
2018. Aggregate demand growth is not dissimilar to that of the WOO 2012. Over 
this period, demand in OECD America is stable, but falls in other OECD regions, so 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
OECD 46.0 45.6 45.4 45.2 45.0 44.8 44.6
Developing countries 37.8 38.9 40.1 41.1 42.2 43.3 44.4
India 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6
China 9.7 10.1 10.4 10.8 11.1 11.5 11.9
Eurasia 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4
World 88.9 89.6 90.7 91.6 92.5 93.5 94.4
Medium-term oil demand outlook in the Reference Case  mb/dEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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that OECD aggregate demand falls gradually, having peaked in 2005. Demand in 
Russia and other Eurasia increases very slowly. As in previous WOO projections, the 
main demand increases are found in developing countries, with an annual rise of 
1.1 mb/d. We still expect that by the second half of 2014, non-OECD oil demand 
will be greater than OECD demand for the first time.
Oil demand reaches 108.5 mb/d by 2035, a rise of 20 mb/d from 2012
Long-term oil demand growth has changed slightly from the WOO 2012 due to, inter 
alia, new IMO regulations on efficiency for new and existing ships; the slight increase 
in the rate of economic growth, which adds another 3% to global GDP by 2035; and 
a reassessment of car ownership prospects in China, where transport infrastructure is 
keeping pace with stronger growth in the vehicle stock. Long-term oil demand in the 
Reference Case increases by close to 20 mb/d over the period 2012–2035, reaching 
108.5 mb/d by 2035, up from 107.3 mb/d in the WOO 2012. It is significant that 
this long-term projection is the first upward revision since the WOO was first pro-
duced. Of this increase, developing Asia accounts for 88%, while demand in China, 
India and other developing Asia reaches 94% of that of the OECD by 2035. 
2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
OECD 46.0 45.2 44.2 43.1 41.8 40.4
Developing countries 37.8 41.1 46.6 51.8 57.0 62.1
India 3.7 4.0 5.0 6.2 7.6 9.3
China 9.7 10.8 12.7 14.4 16.0 17.5
Eurasia 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.8 6.0
World 88.9 91.6 96.3 100.7 104.6 108.5
Long-term oil demand outlook in the Reference Case  mb/d
Car ownership to rise strongly, particularly in developing Asia
In the Reference Case, China sees by far the largest rise in passenger car volumes, 
increasing by more than 380 million over 2010–2035, as it moves from 43 cars 
per 1,000 in 2010 to 
320 cars per 1,000 in 
2035, similar to the 
rate seen in Japan in 
the early 1990s. The 
next largest rise is in 
India, with car own-
ership rates rising to 
levels seen in South 
Korea in 1993. Out-
side of the developing 
Asia the group with 
the largest increase in 
passenger car owner-
ship is OPEC Member EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Countries, with an increase of close to 90 million cars over the years 2010–2035. 
In the Reference Case, the total number of cars more than doubles by 2035, com-
pared to 2010 levels, reaching almost 1.9 billion cars. Over the period 2010–2035, 
OECD countries see the volume of passenger cars rise by 125 million. In developing 
countries the rise is more dramatic, with an extra 800 million cars over this period. 
This is 100 million more than in the WOO 2012. By 2028, there will be more cars 
in developing countries than in the OECD, with 64% of this increase in developing 
Asia. In addition to car stock growth, the number of commercial vehicles will ap-
proach 500 million by 2035, another important source of oil demand growth. Here 
again, developing Asia is the key source for this growth. 
Alternative fuels and vehicle technology development and penetration will 
limit demand growth
Beyond volume patterns, oil demand in the road transportation sector is determined 
by the efficiency of the vehicle fleet using internal combustion engines (ICE), and 
the pace of development and penetration of vehicle technologies, including hybrids 
and non-petroleum-based engines. The efficiency of ICE vehicles will be determined 
by policies, technological developments and consumer preferences, as well as scrap-
page rates, the choice between gasoline and diesel for passenger cars, and possible 
changes in the scope for efficiency improvements in commercial vehicles. Possibili-
ties for alternative technologies in the transportation sector include hybrids (seen as 
the most likely to emerge over the projection period to 2035), Plug-in hybrid electric 
vehicles (with their high price remaining a key challenge), battery electric vehicles 
(though they also have a high price, as well as significantly shorter vehicle range and 
long charging time) and natural gas vehicles (which are limited by the availability 
of refuelling infrastructure, despite growth in some markets). The average global 
decline in oil use per vehicle is around 2% p.a., similar to that of the WOO 2012.
A steady increase in total non-OPEC liquids supply expected over the   
medium-term 
The primary driver of recent non-OPEC liquids supply output growth has been the 
US & Canada, due mainly to increases in US tight oil supply. The current expecta-
tion is that the increase of 2.5 mb/d 2010–2013 will be followed by a further rise of 
1.6 mb/d by 2018 in the Reference Case. However, the Reference Case expects the 
production of tight 
oil in the future to 
face inherent con-
straints and chal-
lenges, including 
steep decline rates, 
a transition away 
from ‘sweet spots’, 
environmental con-
cerns, questions 
about the availabil-
ity of equipment 
and skilled labour, 
and rising costs. 
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On the other hand, progress will continue in improving drilling efficiencies, opti-
mizing fracking and completion operations, and reducing unit costs. New plays are 
likely to emerge in the US. While no tight oil supply outside North America is as-
sumed in the Reference Case, a high side supply scenario addresses this possibility, 
as well as a higher potential for the North American tight oil outlook. This results 
in an additional 2.7 mb/d of tight oil in 2035, so that in the higher case, tight oil 
eventually stays at a plateau of around 6.5 mb/d.  
Non-OPEC supply over the period 2012–2018 increases steadily, rising by   
5.7 mb/d over this period. While the key sources of supply growth are tight oil and 
Canadian oil sands, other sources are expected to register increases: primarily crude 
oil from Latin America (mainly Brazil and Columbia), Middle East & Africa, and the 
Russia & Caspian, together with some increases in biofuels supply (mainly from Brazil 
and Europe). These increases compensate for expected oil supply declines in OECD 
Europe (North Sea) and Mexico. OPEC supply of NGLs is also expected to continue 
increasing over the medium-term, from 5.5 mb/d in 2012 to 6.4 mb/d by 2018.
The call on OPEC crude in the Reference Case reaches around 29 mb/d for 
2015–2018
Combining projections for demand, non-OPEC supply and OPEC NGLs means that, 
in the Reference Case, the amount of OPEC crude required will fall from 30.3 mb/d 
in 2013 to 29.2 mb/d in 2018.
Tight oil is expected to decline after 2020, in the Reference Case 
In the Reference Case, a slowdown in the contribution of tight oil to supply is ex-
pected in the long-term. Constraints could come from the resource base, while im-
provements in drilling efficiencies and fracking operations could plateau, and sweet 
spots could mature. In 
addition, well econom-
ics could deteriorate 
rapidly away from the 
best play areas. Tight 
oil supply from US & 
Canada is expected to 
have plateaued already 
by 2017–2019. To fore-
cast tight oil production 
up to 2035, the three 
main plays were ana-
lyzed in detail (in addi-
tion to others): Bakken/
Three Forks, Eagle Ford 
and the Permian Basin. 
The Reference Case sees tight oil supply in North America declining steadily after 
the medium-term period to reach just 2.7 mb/d by 2035. 
Total non-OPEC liquids supply continues to rise over the long-term
The main long-term increases in liquids supply are expected from Latin Ameri-
ca and the Caspian. Total supply from the US & Canada also continues to rise.   
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Although crude and NGLs supply in that region gradually falls in line with the re-
source constraint and the drop in supply from tight oil, the rise in oil sands – and, 
to a lesser extent, biofuels supply – compensates for this slightly. Declines are 
expected in mature regions where the resource constraint will be increasingly felt, 
particularly OECD Europe and Mexico, but also in Asia. Russia is seen to aim for a 
production plateau of close to 11 mb/d. Although non-OPEC crude supply declines 
over the period 2020–2035, the increases in liquids supply more than compensate 
for declines elsewhere, so that total non-OPEC supply rises from 53 mb/d in 2012 
to 62 mb/d by 2035. Throughout the projection period, crude output from non-
OPEC regions exceeds that of OPEC.
World liquids supply outlook in the Reference Case  mb/d
2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
OECD 21.1 22.8 23.4 23.7 23.9 24.1
of which: tight oil 2.5 4.4 4.7 3.9 3.3 2.7
DCs, excl. OPEC 16.3 17.4 19.1 19.4 19.2 19.2
Eurasia 13.4 13.9 14.3 14.6 14.9 15.3
Processing gains 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.0
Non-OPEC 52.9 56.4 59.3 60.4 60.9 61.6
Crude 40.4 42.3 42.9 41.6 39.7 38.0
NGLs 6.1 6.8 7.4 7.6 7.8 7.9
Other liquids 4.3 5.0 6.5 8.5 10.6 12.7
OPEC (incl. NGLs) 36.8 35.5 37.2 40.5 43.9 47.1
OPEC NGLs 5.5 6.0 6.8 7.6 8.4 8.9
OPEC GTLs 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
OPEC crude 31.1 29.2 29.9 32.3 34.8 37.5
Stock change & misc. 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
World supply 89.7 92.0 96.5 100.9 104.8 108.7
The Reference Case sees a rise in the call on OPEC crude to 37.5 mb/d by 
2035
After a steady medium-term call on OPEC crude oil of around 29 mb/d, OPEC crude 
supply over the long-term rises in the Reference Case. By 2035, it is over 37 mb/d, 
more than 6 mb/d higher than in 2012. This is 2.6 mb/d higher than in the WOO 
2012. The share of OPEC crude in world liquids supply over the period 2020–2035 
is in the range of 31–35%, always below 2012 levels.
Oil-related investment requirements approach $8 trillion between 2012 
and 2035
The Reference Case carries implications for investment needs across the entire oil 
supply chain. In the period to 2035, upstream investment requirements, based 
upon Reference Case volumes, as well as the need to invest to compensate for 
natural declines, are estimated at more than $5 trillion. Global refining investments 
are estimated at around $1.5 trillion, out of which $280 billion are needed for   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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investment in existing projects, $370 billion for required additions and around 
$800 billion for maintenance and replacement. The key components of the ad-
ditional investments needed beyond the refinery gate (typically referred to as the 
midstream sector) relate to the necessary expansions in regional pipeline systems 
and tanker capacity that are required to move volumes of crude oil and liquid prod-
ucts. In addition to this, some investments will be necessary for loading and receiv-
ing ports, and related storage capacity, as well as to expand the retail distribution 
network. Combined, midstream investment costs for the period up to 2035 are 
estimated to be at around $1 trillion. All together, this results in an estimated oil-
related investment requirement of $7.5 trillion between 2012 and 2035.
Economic growth scenarios are developed to explore uncertainties
The impacts of alternative assumptions for economic growth explore both downside 
risk and upside potential. Many elements combine to produce a given increase 
in medium- and long-term economic activity, and each of these is subject to am-
biguities and uncertainties. There are demographic factors, both in terms of the 
growth of the working population as well as retirement age and education levels, in 
addition to questions about factor productivity, which is affected by the extent of 
free trade, investments in Research & Development (R&D), and the quantity and 
quality of capital. In the different scenarios, the range of economic growth reflect-
ing these uncertainties is allowed to vary across regions; and downside risks are 
assumed to be greater than the upside potential. Average global economic growth 
thereby range from 3.0% to 3.9% p.a. in the low and high economic growth rates, 
respectively.
Economic growth scenarios show wide range of required OPEC crude oil
By 2035, oil remains below 100 mb/d in the low economic growth (LEG) sce-
nario. This is 10.1 
mb/d less than in the 
Reference Case. By 
2025, the reduction 
is already 5.1 mb/d. 
However, the distri-
bution across coun-
tries is not uniform: 
77% of the decline 
in demand is in de-
veloping countries. If 
OPEC absorbs all of 
this loss in demand, 
the call on OPEC 
crude oil falls to 27 
mb/d by 2020 and 
then stays approxi-
mately constant at that level throughout the period to 2035. The higher economic 
growth scenario sees additional demand of 7.5 mb/d by 2035, compared to the 
Reference Case. Demand exceeds 100 mb/d between 2020 and 2025, more than 
ten years earlier than under the LEG scenario. By 2035, it reaches 116 mb/d. 
Changes to urban and rural population size by region, 2012–2035 Real GDP by region in 2012 and 2035
Increase in number of passenger cars, 2010–2035
Change in non-OPEC supply, 2012–2018
Tight oil supply in OECD America to 2035
OPEC crude oil supply in the economic growth scenarios
Assumption for tight oil supply in North America
in the upside supply scenario
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Upside supply (UPS) scenario also explores possible impacts upon OPEC 
supply needs
This Outlook includes a scenario that looks at the possible impacts of higher non-
OPEC supply than in the Reference Case. The Upside Supply (UPS) scenario in-
cludes considerations over the future path of tight oil supply in North America, but 
also the possibilities of 
developments in other 
non-OPEC countries 
outside of North Amer-
ica. This scenario takes 
a more optimistic view 
of the level of ultimate-
ly recoverable resources 
(URR) than in the Ref-
erence Case. The sce-
nario sees supply 1.3 
mb/d higher than in the 
Reference Case already 
by 2020, with a fur-
ther widening thereaf-
ter, reaching 2.5 mb/d 
higher than the Refer-
ence Case by 2035. In addition to the potential for a more rapid expansion of supply 
from North American tight oil, there are also additional tight oil resources in other 
non-OPEC countries, particularly Russia, Argentina and China. Prospects for upside 
production assumptions for other crude oil and NGLs seem also possible in Brazil and 
Russia. The scenario emphasizes the potential scale of development and production 
of the pre-salt play in Brazil. Since Russia’s resource base is also sufficient to sup-
port more crude supply than in the Reference Case, the UPS scenario explores the 
scope for a slightly higher plateau of Russian supply. Finally, the scenario foresees 
higher supply from biofuels. The highest potential for additional biofuels exists in 
the US and two other key regions: Europe and Brazil. In total, the UPS scenario adds   
5.7 mb/d of additional non-OPEC liquids supply by 2035, compared to the   
Reference Case.
Changes to urban and rural population size by region, 2012–2035 Real GDP by region in 2012 and 2035
Increase in number of passenger cars, 2010–2035
Change in non-OPEC supply, 2012–2018
Tight oil supply in OECD America to 2035
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Assumption for tight oil supply in North America
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Assumptions for additional liquids supply in the 
upside supply scenario  mb/d
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Tight crude  0.28 1.21 1.95 2.42 2.68
Tight NGLs  0.09 0.29 0.53 0.78 0.97
Other crude 0.00 0.60 0.54 0.94 1.45
Other NGLs 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05
Biofuels  0.00 0.04 0.17 0.36 0.59
Non-OPEC 0.37 2.18 3.24 4.55 5.73EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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UPS scenario further emphasizes the uncertainty over the call on OPEC 
crude
If it is assumed that this additional supply in the UPS scenario is fully absorbed 
by OPEC in the form of lower crude supply, then OPEC crude supply will be   
31.7 mb/d by 2035. OPEC crude supply would then remain below 28 m/b until 
2021, falling steadily throughout the rest of the decade. However, as with the 
economic growth scenarios, the lower OPEC crude path may not be deemed fea-
sible or sustainable. 
Transport fuels drive future refined products demand; middle distillates 
take the lead
Global demand for the product category of middle distillates is set to increase by 
almost 12 mb/d between 2012 and 2035, representing around 60% of overall 
demand growth for all liquid products. Besides diesel oil, the trend for increased 
mobility will also drive future demand for gasoline and jet kerosene and, to some 
extent, will contribute to the consumption of liquefied petroleum gas. The impor-
tance of the transportation sector is reflected in the fact that, out of 19.6 mb/d of 
additional demand by 2035, compared to 2012, more than 12 mb/d, or around 
62%, comes from liquids demand for various transport modes. Nevertheless, naph-
tha is anticipated to be the fastest growing light product over the forecast period, 
especially in developing Asian countries. Contrary to these products, residual fuel 
oil is set to decline globally in the coming years. 
Most refining projects expected in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East
Existing refining projects worldwide will add around 8.6 mb/d of new distilla-
tion capacity in the period 2013–2018. Moreover, this will be supported by 
an additional 5.5 mb/d of conversion units, almost 7 mb/d of desulphurization   
*  Includes refinery fuel oil.
** Includes bitumen, lubricants, waxes, still gas, coke, sulphur, direct use of crude oil, etc.
2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Light products
Ethane/LPG 9.7 10.0 10.5 10.9 11.2 11.5
Naphtha 5.9 6.2 6.8 7.3 7.9 8.5
Gasoline 22.7 23.3 24.4 25.5 26.5 27.5
Middle distillates
Jet/Kerosene 6.5 6.7 7.1 7.4 7.7 8.1
Diesel/Gasoil 25.8 27.3 30.0 32.2 34.1 36.0
Heavy products
Residual fuel* 8.2 7.8 7.1 6.6 6.3 6.0
Other** 10.0 10.2 10.5 10.7 10.8 10.9
Total  88.9 91.6 96.3 100.7 104.6 108.5
Global product demand  mb/dEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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capacity and more than   
2 mb/d of octane units. The 
greatest portion of this new 
capacity is expected to ma-
terialize in the Asia-Pacific, 
which accounts for almost 
45% (or 3.8 mb/d) of addi-
tional capacity. Out of this, 
China alone will expand its 
refining sector by 2.5 mb/d, 
which easily makes it the 
country with the largest ca-
pacity additions in the me-
dium-term. On top of this, 
some incremental capacity 
will also be achieved through capacity creep, making total additions to crude distil-
lation as high as 9.5 mb/d by 2018.
Potential production from new refining projects exceeds the incremental 
‘call on refining’, making for a cumulative overhang of 4 mb/d by 2018
Potential incremental crude runs based on new refining capacity average a little under 
1.5 mb/d annually through 2018. On a cumulative basis, these are 4.7 mb/d by 2015 
and 8.6 mb/d by 2018. In contrast, annual global demand growth through 2018 is 
projected to average 0.9 mb/d. Of this, it is estimated that incremental supplies of 
biofuels, natural gas liquids 
(NGLs) and other non-crude 
streams will satisfy 22% of 
the growth, leaving 78% (or 
around 0.76 mb/d annually 
on average) to come from re-
fined products. These levels 
are only slightly above 50% 
of the potential production 
from the refinery projects 
expected to come onstream 
in the medium-term. In 
short, potential production 
from new projects exceeds 
the incremental ‘call on re-
fining’ every year by 0.4–0.8 mb/d between 2013 and 2018, making for a cumulative 
overhang of 4 mb/d by 2018. This outlook presages both a period of severe interna-
tional competition for product markets and the need to continue refinery closures on 
a significant scale if depressed refining margins are to be averted. 
Despite improved balance for diesel, new projects still produce excess gas-
oline and naphtha
While there is some uncertainty and flexibility in the product yields that will 
result from any one refining project, balances show a continuation of projects 
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that produce too much naphtha/gasoline, with a cumulative surplus of 2 mb/d by 
2018, almost half of the total surplus. The data indicate residual fuel in surplus 
too, with more than 1 mb/d globally by 2018, but also, interestingly, distillates 
at over 0.5 mb/d. This is a change from previous WOO outlooks, which consist-
ently indicated a distillate deficit. This reflects both the industry shifting to add 
more distillate capacity and a trimming back in the estimates for distillate de-
mand growth. While this implies margins relative to crude for naphtha/gasoline 
are likely to remain weak, as had been projected in previous outlooks, those for 
distillate may now also be less strong in the medium-term as the global supply/
demand system adjusts.
Restoring refining margins to long-term viable levels may require closing 
more than 10 mb/d of crude distillation capacity
A growing surplus in refining capacity highlights an unavoidable need for continued 
rationalization. The Outlook’s model results indicate that to return margins to long-
term viable levels, closures on the order of 10 mb/d may be necessary, implying 
an associated global utilization rate of at least 85% and possibly even higher. To 
achieve this level of utilization rate, capacity closures would have to occur across 
both the industrialized and, to a lesser degree, developing regions. However, as 
past experience has shown, there is often a reluctance to accept refinery closures. 
Therefore, it remains to be seen as to how long the situation of relatively low global 
utilizations will persist.  
Additional crude distillation capacity of 20 mb/d required in the period to 
2035, mostly in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East 
Cumulative total capacity additions (firm projects plus total further model addi-
tions) are projected to reach 20 mb/d by 2035. The vast majority of these expan-
sions are projected as needed in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, 10.5 and 
3 mb/d, respectively. In 
Latin America, projected 
capacity additions of 
2.4 mb/d by 2035 are 
closely aligned with the 
projections for demand 
growth for the same pe-
riod. Refining capacity in 
Africa is projected to rise 
by 1.3 mb/d followed by 
Russia & Caspian, which 
will require 1.8 mb/d of 
additional crude units by 
2035.
Growing demand for light products and middle distillates will force refiners 
to increase complexity 
The Reference Case projections highlight a continuing need to increase conversion 
capacity relative to distillation. Against a conversion to distillation ratio of 40% 
that applies globally today, both existing projects and total additions of almost   
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13 mb/d of conversion 
capacity requirements 
through 2035 exhibit a 
conversion to distillation 
ratio of 64%. Substantial 
additions to desulphuriza-
tion capacity will also be 
necessary to meet future 
specifications for sulphur 
content. These are esti-
mated at close to 27 mb/d 
by 2035.  
Reference Case projections point to moderate light-heavy crude differen-
tials in the medium-term, widening in the long-term
Given Reference Case projections for regional supply and demand levels, and 
changes in the global crude slate, a continuation of moderate light-heavy crude 
differentials in the medium-term is indicated, followed by a progressive widening in 
the long-term. The moderate differentials in the short-term stem from the existence 
of excess refining capacity and the lightening of the global crude slate. In turn, 
the long-term trend toward a widening of the differentials, with heavy sour grades 
especially affected, is mainly due to a return over time toward a more balanced 
downstream – a principle of the long-term modelling approach – as well as a gradual 
shift toward a more heavy crude slate. This will be alongside continued declines 
in inland and especially marine residual fuels demand. In addition, the on-going 
trend toward sulphur reduction in transport fuels will further differentiate crude oils 
depending on their sulphur content.
New oil transport routes could potentially affect future oil movements be-
tween major regions
Emerging changes in future oil movements clearly indicate the sensitivity of the 
global oil trade system to the development of new export/import routes. From the 
perspective of inter-regional crude trade, the two areas that deserve special atten-
tion, and which could potentially have a significant impact on future oil flows, are 
Eurasia and North America. Developments that primarily expand pipeline capacity 
in these continents appear critical because a significant part of the oil supply there 
is located deep inland and far from consuming markets, whether at home or abroad. 
Therefore, the directions in which future transport routes will be developed have the 
potential not only to reshape future oil flows, but also to impact price differentials.
Demand increases in Asia-Pacific will re-balance the flow of crude oil and 
refined products
Projections underscore the Middle East’s future role as the major crude oil exporter, 
despite the slight medium-term crude export decline, which will mainly be com-
pensated by higher products exports from new refineries in the region. Beyond the 
medium-term, total crude oil exports from the region will grow continuously, drawn 
by rising demand in the Asia-Pacific, which will develop as a major trade partner. 
Total crude exports from the Middle East are projected to surpass the 20 mb/d mark 
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by the end of the forecast period. For the Asia-Pacific, however, the Middle East will 
not be an exclusive partner to cover its crude demand; growing Asia-Pacific demand 
will result in an increase in crude imports from practically all producing regions. 
In absolute numbers, the biggest change over the forecast period relates to crude 
oil imports from the Middle East, which will increase by 5 mb/d from 2012–2035, 
followed by Russia & Caspian (2.6 mb/d), Africa and Canada (each around 1 mb/d). 
Asian imports from Latin America are projected to be around 1 mb/d. Crude imports 
to the US & Canada is set to decline and its composition will be determined by the 
type of additional barrels that are expected to be produced in the region. The medi-
um-term is dominated by a greater portion of increased light tight oil production in 
the region. This will gradually displace part of the current imports from Africa and 
the North Sea. The key factors in the long-term are the gradual decline of tight oil, 
which will stabilize imports from Africa at lower levels, and the rise in heavy streams 
from Canada. These factors will work against imports from heavy crude exporters. 
Climate change-related policies and measures add to uncertainty
The upstream oil industry faces uncertainties associated with how future climate 
change-related policies and measures might affect the use of fossil fuels, in gen-
eral, and oil, in particular. In order to assess potential impacts of future mitigation 
policies, a computable general equilibrium model of the world economy has been 
used to develop scenarios. Under a 550 parts per million (ppm) greenhouse gas 
(GHG) stabilization scenario, the model results indicate that reducing emissions 
by targeting the transportation sector is costlier than using other climate change 
mitigation alternatives. In such a case, analysis using a general equilibrium model 
shows that world GDP is 6.7% lower and OPEC’s GDP is reduced by 24.8% from 
its 2050 level in the Reference Case, which is much higher than the 17.7% OPEC 
GDP reduction foreseen in the scenario where regional carbon trading is permitted. 
Across scenarios, the range in oil demand decline relative to the Reference Case is 
large. At the low end, with full global carbon trading, the emphasis of GHG reduc-
tion is on the electricity generation sector, involving both a switch away from coal, 
as well as widespread implementation of carbon capture and storage (CCS) tech-
nologies. Additionally, forestry becomes a major factor in reducing net emissions. In 
this case, oil demand by 2050 is just 5% lower than in the Reference Case. At the 
other extreme, policies that target regulation of the transportation sector result in 
far higher losses in oil demand, which falls 23% by 2050 relative to the Reference 
Case. There are ‘win-win’ policies and measures that can deliver effective mitigation 
in a cost effective manner, and that have the least adverse effects on oil producers 
and the global economy. However, it is far from clear whether these least-cost miti-
gation policies and measures will be pursued.
Availability of skilled manpower is a major challenge to the oil and gas 
industry
The oil and gas industry is known for being capital intensive and technology driven; 
it also employs a diverse workforce with a range of abilities and highly specialized 
skills. Recent global trends have put pressure on the industry to find and recruit 
necessary manpower. This has put the issue of human resource bottlenecks on the 
agenda of many companies and organizations. In a recent study, almost 80% of oil 
and gas companies at the global level reported significant manpower shortages in EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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key technical areas. There are also fewer skilled graduates entering the industry, 
in part the result of the unattractiveness of the industry as a workplace, but also a 
consequence of the poor record that universities have of offering relevant studies 
in technical areas important to the oil and gas industry. In combination with the 
industry’s ageing trend, this has resulted in an important distribution gap between 
the large number of senior professionals who will be retiring soon and the smaller 
numbers of new professionals who will be starting. The result is in fewer mid-career 
employees, especially those with more than 20 years of work experience. In ad-
dressing the challenge of manpower bottlenecks and skills shortages, stakeholders 
in the oil and gas industry need to address structural problems in education and 
training, and improve the industry’s image. Governments, in turn, need to bet-
ter understand the employment gap, facilitate and support international mobility 
and provide support to educational initiatives. In addition, broader shared solutions 
would be useful, particularly since the oil and gas sector will remain essential for 
the global economy in the 21st century and for the foreseeable future.
Dialogue and cooperation is beneficial for market stability
OPEC continues to engage in focused activities in international dialogue and co-
operation. An example is its participation in the International Energy Forum (IEF), 
which plays an important role in the strengthening of cooperation and dialogue 
between producers and consumers. This has been pursued through various events, 
such as the Joint Organisations Data Initiative (JODI) programme, workshops and 
symposia, and other regional summits. In addition, the 14th IEF Ministerial Fo-
rum will take place in 2014. OPEC has also been closely involved in several of 
the G-20’s energy related workstreams focused on, for example, the role of PRAs 
and enhancing JODI related activities. Other on-going dialogues are being pursued, 
particularly with the EU and Russia, as OPEC continues to value the importance 
of a cooperative and coordinated approach to dialogue that is beneficial for market 
stability both in the short- and the long-term.